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The current round of fiftieth-anniversary celebrations 
of the events of the 1960s are a reminder that the American 
civic conversation is still framed in Great Society terms. 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society effort—comprised of 
nearly two hundred major domestic measures during his 
five years in office—restructured policy in the areas of 
health, education, immigration, urban governance, mass 
transit, public housing, and the stewardship of natural and cultural resources, in 
addition to epochal civil rights reforms. Whether viewed as the point at which the 
American experience veered off course or as a moment when the nation renewed 
its commitment to equality and civic excellence, the Johnson years identified goals 
and launched programs that remain at the center of domestic policy arguments. 
We delve into the Great Society record in hopes of understanding what produced 
the Sixties’ great burst of political creativity and what led it to fade and also to 
seek a basis for judging the value of the effort. The five works reviewed here 
inquire after the social and political conditions that made enactment of the Great 
Society program possible and, ultimately, led the policymaking enthusiasm to 
subside. They explore the intertwined roles of activism at the grassroots and in 
Washington, first in facilitating the passage of the landmark legislation of those 
years (paying particular attention to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965), and then in working out its implementation in 
American communities. 
James T. Patterson’s The Eve of Destruction reminds readers of the tumult 
of 1965, the year in which the Eighty-Ninth Congress convened and Lyndon 
Johnson launched his Great Society in earnest. The year opened with the fulsome 
promises of LBJ’s first State of the Union address as president in his own right. 
It was darkened by the February launch of Operation Rolling Thunder (the U.S. 
bombing campaign against North Vietnam), the first landing of U.S. Marine 
combat forces at Da Nang in March, and the fateful decision to escalate American 
involvement in the Asian ground war in July. The year saw the assassination of 
Malcolm X in February, the mauling of civil rights activists in Selma the next 
month, and the explosion of Watts in August. Yet the same year also witnessed 
federal legislative achievement of a magnitude not seen since the heyday of 
the New Deal, including the creation of Medicare and Medicaid, passage of 
the landmark Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) and Voting Rights 
(VRA) acts, and enactment of fundamental immigration reform. 
Patterson describes 1964 as “a buoyant time . . . a prosperous year that pro-
moted extraordinarily high expectations about the future” (1). They were “the 
most hopeful times in all the years since Christ was born” in Johnson’s own ill-
advised Christmas 1964 phrasing (ix). Against this rosy background, Patterson 
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sees 1965 as a “hinge” year, the year “when America’s social cohesion began to 
unravel and when the turbulent phenomenon that would be called ‘the Sixties’ 
broke into view” (xi). What evaporated over those twelve months was, essentially, 
that broad public consensus on American goals at home and abroad which is the 
condition precedent for national policymaking. By year’s end, opines Patterson, 
“the once powerful political clout of liberalism was no more” (244). 
In Patterson’s view, the transformation was driven by two factors. The first 
was the Vietnam escalation, which “[m]ore than any other event of the year … 
spurred the polarization that characterized the Sixties in the United States” (89). 
Patterson traces the devolution to the bitterness brought about by Johnson’s in-
decision about American war aims and his furtiveness—the choice to develop 
Vietnam policy in secrecy rather than open the issue to public dialogue and 
congressional debate. The other source of polarization for Patterson was “the 
fracturing and enfeebling of the nonviolent, interracial civil rights movement” 
(225). The conflagration in Watts “left the once proud and luminously effective 
civil rights movement in a state of disarray from which it never recovered” (179) 
and began the shift in national attention from the War on Poverty to the war on 
crime. New social movement militancy confirmed many Americans’ view that 
“an inexorably expanding rights-consciousness—a ‘rights revolution’—was un-
dermining a durable and long-cherished culture of rules and responsibilities” (xi).
The hinge is a useful device for historians seeking to focus an historical 
narrative narrowly, but, as Patterson recognizes, it is historiographically suspect. 
While the year 1965 saw significant developments in both African-American 
activism and Vietnam policy, alternative inflection points are readily discern-
ible. August 1964, for example, saw the exclusion of the Mississippi Freedom 
Democratic Party (MFDP) delegation from the Democratic National Convention 
and the abdication of congressional responsibility in the Gulf of Tonkin resolu-
tion, both portentous events. If the civil rights movement splintered, Watts was 
not the cause. And as for Vietnam, large majorities supported the president’s 
policies late into the decade.
The difficulty of the hinge device is that in narrowing historical perspective 
it leads to misidentification of the sources of change. The change agents that 
Patterson identifies are, on a longer view, themselves only symptoms of broader, 
if more subtle, sea changes. For one, there is simple demography, rarely given 
its due in accounts of the 1960s. The overlooked common denominator among 
the black liberation, student, anti-war, and women’s liberation movements is the 
youth of their participants. The availability of large numbers of relatively affluent 
young people primed to critique their parents’ society goes far to explain Sixties 
turmoil, as is suggested by the global youth eruptions—Tokyo, Paris, Mexico 
City—of 1968. 
The year 1965 is less a hinge—which suggests a marked change in direc-
tion—than a next phase, a predictable development from immediately preceding 
events. In brief, the year 1965 was different from 1964 because things got harder. 
The lofty promises of 1964 now had to be translated into program. The “easy” 
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battles of the civil rights movement against de jure segregation were replaced by 
the more difficult struggle to crush de facto Jim Crow. Instead of the cakewalk 
they had anticipated, U.S. Marines arriving in Vietnam confronted the fero-
cious determination of the Vietcong. And, as Patterson notes, Lyndon Johnson’s 
“fabulous Eighty-Ninth ” Congress was pouring out vast new domestic programs 
with little thought for the governmental infrastructure that would be necessary to 
implement them. The consequences of this mix of activated citizenry, overblown 
policy promises, and administrative gridlock were predictable: it is surprising 
that civil society held together as well as it did.
The Fierce Urgency of Now: Lyndon Johnson, Congress, and the Battle for 
the Great Society examines one of the chief motors of this Sixties turbulence—
federal policymaking. Julian Zelizer examines the Johnson presidency from its 
1964 triumphs in speeding John Kennedy’s pending tax and civil rights bills 
through Congress to LBJ’s resigned acceptance of deep spending cuts in Great 
Society programs in 1968—the price extracted by congressional conservatives in 
exchange for the tax increase needed to fund his ruinous Vietnam policy. Zelizer 
retells this familiar story in order to challenge what he identifies as two “myths” 
about the political environment of the Johnson years. The first is that the 1960s 
represented “the apex of modern American liberalism,” the political outlook that 
viewed activist national government “as a positive good” and that it was this 
favorable environment that enabled enactment of the president’s program (3). 
Zelizer asserts that, to the contrary, in 1964 “liberalism was in bad shape, fragile 
and ineffective, beset on all sides by powerful enemies” (5). The second myth 
is that the Great Society was “the product of Lyndon Johnson’s brilliant legisla-
tive prowess” (5)—a view, asserts Zelizer, that “overemphasizes the capacity 
of ‘great men’ to effect legislation by force of personality” and undervalues the 
“complicated … political environment in which a president must operate” (7).
Zelizer suggests that in “seeking to understand how this historic burst of 
liberal domestic legislation happened” we should ask instead “what legislative 
conditions existed” to allow its success (8). He credits two factors in particular. 
The first of these was the effectiveness of the civil rights movement, which 
“placed immense pressure on legislators in both parties to pass laws that would 
benefit African Americans” (8). The second factor, argues Zelizer, was the liber-
als’ landslide success in the 1964 election, which enabled them to break through 
conservatives’ hold on Congress (8). Zelizer’s framing is open to challenge. For 
one, if landslide margins in Congress were essential to Great Society success, 
how does he explain 1964—a banner year legislatively with the passage of the 
Kennedy bills and the launch of the War on Poverty?
More importantly, Zelizer’s assertion about the “fragile” state of liberalism 
is not well defended here. That the Johnson years were, indeed, a “high tide” of 
American liberalism is suggested by the fact, noted by Zelizer, that LBJ himself 
“recognized that the moment for another New Deal had arrived” (62). Zelizer 
doesn’t classify this as a liberal moment in part because he is mindful of potent 
conservative influences in Congress and in part because he views it, narrowly, as a 
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product solely of “the energy, ambitions, and anger of the civil rights movement” 
(62). This formulation continues the unfortunate tendency to pop the civil rights 
movement out of its context as one piece in the complex structure of postwar 
liberalism, a structure that included a beleaguered left, peace activism, and a 
rising student movement, as well as still-potent unionism. Jointly, these move-
ments created the liberal climate—the “culminating liberal moment”—in which 
effective civil rights initiatives and the larger Great Society program emerged. 
Zelizer touches on but does not explore three other factors that had a lively 
role in shaping the Great Society, and especially Johnson’s “fabulous Eighty-
Ninth” Congress. The first of these are the repercussions of the removal of the 
issue of de jure segregation from future congressional debates through the passage 
of 1964 and 1965 civil rights legislation. It was this development that cracked 
the hold of the conservative coalition of Republicans and Southern Democrats 
on Capitol Hill. Zelizer asserts that this disruption changed the political dynamic 
within Congress only in its dealings with other civil rights legislation. But in 
disposing of the segregation issue, the civil rights legislation broadly removed 
the basis for the bargains that had held the conservative coalition together—con-
servative Republicans offering their support for Jim Crow in return for Southern 
Democrats’ votes on federal spending programs that Republicans preferred to 
kill. As Zelizer himself shows, the coalition’s collapse allowed for passage of 
the ESEA with substantial southern support.
Second, Zelizer describes, but does not include in his argument, the role 
of bipartisan cooperation in the Eighty-Ninth Congress. To an extent entirely 
exotic to twenty-first century eyes, congressional Democrats and Republicans of 
the Johnson years worked together. Zelizer depicts an institutional culture that 
enabled effective contributions from the minority and led to enacted bills. Everett 
Dirksen (R-IL) in the Senate and William McCulloch (R-OH) in the House were 
crucial partners in passing civil rights legislation. Wilbur Mills (D-AR) man-
aged to incorporate both Republican, Democratic, and White House bills in the 
measure that produced Medicare. 
Finally, although he fully credits LBJ’s legislative dexterity, Zelizer leaves 
out what was surely the president’s most crucial contribution to the Great Society: 
his willingness to undertake it. Whichever of history’s whispering ambitions John-
son was responding to, he chose to put forward a program of startling scope and 
aspiration. One can imagine a very different outcome under any other Kennedy 
successor (look only at the previous century’s Johnson). Lyndon Johnson cannot 
be accounted for as a force in history by reference to his legislative prowess alone.
Where Zelizer surveys the Great Society legislative process as a whole, 
Gary May’s Bending Toward Justice: The Voting Rights Act and the Transforma-
tion of American Democracy takes a focused look at one of its most significant 
achievements. His volume spans the more than five decades between civil rights 
activists’ efforts to register Selma, Alabama voters in the early 1960s to present-
day vote suppression controversies. May brings private citizens, the force that 
created the movement, back into the picture. His detailed telling reanimates the 
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internal complexity of the civil rights movement and the fragile contingency 
of the events that in the end yielded the Selma confrontation. The account also 
raises, although it does not address, the question of grassroots action’s influence 
in shaping the VRA.
It is impossible to tell history in its full complexity, so it is small wonder 
that the stories we tell about social change tend to reduce its processes to a series 
of negotiations among leading factions. But efforts vast and various are needed 
to create the conditions under which milestone laws like the VRA emerge. As 
May reminds us, Selma’s battle for the ballot didn’t begin on the Edmund Pet-
tus Bridge. Selma residents C.J. Adams and Samuel and Amelia Boynton had 
carried the burden since reinvigorating the Dallas County Voters League in the 
1930s. Bernard Lafayette arrived in Selma in 1962 as a lone scout for the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and was followed by a SNCC 
project team, which settled in the city during 1963 and 1964. May’s account is 
a reminder that moments like Selma occur only when citizens are moved to risk 
their peace and perhaps their lives in desperation to bring about a new order.
May’s study also unsettles any remaining notions of the civil rights movement 
as a monolithic effort. Different factions had different visions of its goals. Nur-
tured by veteran activist Ella Baker, SNCC workers were community organizers 
striving to create local organizations that would outlast SNCC’s sojourn in the 
community. From SNCC’s vantage, Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
(SCLC) operations were shallowly opportunistic. SCLC campaigns disrupted 
the difficult and tedious work of organizing and exploited local developments for 
their impact on the national scene. SCLC’s reliance on Martin Luther King Jr.’s 
celebrity status and on “publicity stunts” like the Selma-to-Montgomery march 
resulted in a “movement” that shut down as soon as klieg lights were switched 
off, leaving the locals to deal with the mess left behind. If some of these differ-
ences were complementary and productive, ultimately they created an internal 
dynamic that helped break the movement apart.
Detailed accounts like May’s disrupt lazily teleological interpretations 
of social action. It is difficult to recreate the contingency of history—the fact 
that actors do not know how things will work out and operate unaware of the 
harmonies detected in hindsight—but it is that contingency that gives the narra-
tive interest and that May is able to redeem. Selma was anything but a planned 
action. King and SCLC were peripheral to many of the developments there, and 
happenstance shaped much of their involvement with the rest. King arrived in 
Selma at the invitation of local activists on January 2, 1965 and by mid-February 
he was ready to move on. Local white leaders had moderated their policies and 
a federal court had issued an order protecting the voter registration process. 
King suspected that events in Selma “had run their course” (72). SCLC’s return 
to Selma was the result of the fatal shooting of twenty-six-year-old black army 
veteran and civil rights activist Jimmie Lee Jackson by the police. Speaking to 
a mass meeting in a moment of grief and rage following Jackson’s February 26th 
death, King lieutenant James Bevel called for a march on Montgomery. The call 
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had not been planned or cleared by King (81). In fact, on the morning of March 
7th King called the event off, fearing violence (83). Preparations continued due 
to miscommunications with his SCLC aides on the scene and King acquiesced 
in the fait accompli shortly before the marchers set out that afternoon. King, 
preaching in Atlanta, was not present.
The saga of the civil rights movement provides Americans some of our most 
treasured stories about ourselves. We cherish the Selma legend—its lesson that 
humble but righteous citizens can achieve morally necessary changes in the na-
tion’s social contract. This emotional attachment makes it necessary to scrutinize 
carefully whether, and how, citizen action actually does affect policy develop-
ment. May joins the consensus in assuming that events in Selma were important 
to VRA enactment, that “by provoking Sheriff Clark into committing mayhem 
… King had aroused the nation and Congress to action,” but he doesn’t add to 
understandings of how, precisely, that influence operated (149). That Johnson 
was determined to pass voting rights legislation well in advance of the events in 
Selma is evidenced by his communications with his attorney general as early as 
July 1964. The administration draft of the bill was complete on March 1, 1965, 
prior to the Selma confrontation. May does not provide evidence that move-
ment spokespeople had much of a role in shaping the bill. Although Johnson did 
communicate with King about the bill’s provisions, the administration’s major 
concern described here was to ensure that the measure would pass constitutional 
muster, given the Article 1, Section 2 assignment of the authority to determine 
voter eligibility to the states.
The images of the police riot on the Edmund Pettus Bridge, broadcast that 
evening to more than forty-eight million viewers, shocked public opinion and 
drew hundreds of Americans to Selma to join in the completion of the march. 
But would events in Congress have been significantly different had the Selma 
campaign never happened? Johnson’s determination to push a voting rights bill 
through Congress seems clear, and in the wake of his 1964 landslide he had the 
votes to do it. The question remains unanswered.
Works by Thomas Kiffmeyer and Hasan Kwame Jeffries turn attention away 
from Washington, D.C. to examine Great Society policy implementation on the 
ground in Appalachia and Alabama. Kiffmeyer’s Reformers to Radicals: The 
Appalachian Volunteers and the War on Poverty makes an important contribu-
tion to an under-researched area of the Great Society endeavor: its engagement 
with rural, as well as urban, poverty. The Great Society effort in Appalachia 
operated initially through the Council of the Southern Mountains (CSM), a 
venerable Progressive era organization (founded in 1913) that received one of 
the earliest War on Poverty grants. In late 1963 the CSM kicked off a Kentucky 
school rehabilitation program, relying on the labor of students from colleges 
in the region. Student work crews, calling themselves Appalachian Volunteers 
(AVs), fanned out into the first projects in Harlan County, Kentucky in January 
1964. The first War on Poverty grant arrived in December 1964 and the effort 
mushroomed. AV chapters sprouted at colleges around the region and the effort 
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drew national attention: by mid-1965 Students for a Democratic Society members 
were working in the region and a SNCC veteran had been hired as AV assistant 
director. By the summer of 1966 the organization fielded five hundred workers 
in Appalachian communities.
Great Society funding made possible a broader, more intensive organizing 
effort than CSM funding alone could have supported. In Kiffmeyer’s account, 
a key result was that AVs had enough time in the field to rework their thinking 
about the nature of Appalachian problems. The CSM had traditionally espoused 
a strategy of cooperation, working with powerbrokers in the mining industry and 
local governments to address mountain poverty. Youth workers initially adopted 
their sponsor organization’s analysis, including its “culture of poverty” diagnosis, 
which held that mountaineers’ isolation and dysfunctional culture were the main 
factors in their poverty. The appropriate prescription, thus, was education and 
integration into the mainstream. AVs initially targeted Appalachian children with 
“cultural enrichment” activities and school facilities rehabilitations. 
As the enormity of Appalachian troubles came into focus it quickly became 
clear to AV field workers that painting schoolhouses would not be enough. As 
one volunteer observed, “there are so many problems we’re not the solution to” 
(133). “Culture of poverty” thinking was displaced by a new, radical analysis that 
understood Appalachia as “colonized,” exploited territory. Volunteers redirected 
their eff orts to school system reform, welfare rights, and anti–strip mining leg-
islation. They also moved away from the CSM pattern of cooperation with area 
mining interests and political machines: “[c]onfrontation became the new AV 
strategy” (135). Formalizing this ideological parting-of-the-ways, in May 1966 
AV workers split from the CSM and established themselves as the Appalachian 
Volunteers, Inc. 
Operating as an independent, radicalized organization, the AVs rapidly alien-
ated both the communities they attempted to serve and local power structures. 
Volunteers barged into mountain towns—shaggy-haired men and mini-skirted 
women—blithely insensitive to the mores of these conservative communities. 
Worse, despite the evolution of their understanding of Appalachia, AVs never 
overcame the missionary zeal that marked their early forays into “cultural en-
richment.” Continuing to view mountaineers with cloaked condescension as 
victims of cultural deprivation, the young activists proposed “answers” to the 
Appalachian “problem” without having listened to residents’ own views. AVs 
may have aspired to build the New Jerusalem amid Kentucky’s green and pleas-
ant hills, but the locals, as one AV noted, simply “longed . . . to be middle class 
Americans” (210). The AVs’ increasingly radical agenda outran its support in the 
community. “In many cases,” in the view of one observer, “the program seemed 
to belong to the Volunteers rather than the community” (153). 
The AVs’ radicalization and new tactics of confrontation also ran afoul of 
regional stakeholders intent on maintaining stability and the status quo. The 
organization ultimately collapsed under aggressive repression from local and 
state governments: Pike County arrested AV officials on charges of sedition, the 
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Kentucky Un-American Activities Committee investigated the organization for 
subversive activities, and area governors vetoed further War on Poverty funding 
for the effort. By the summer of 1970 the organization was defunct.
But the organization was not gone without a trace. The combination of federal 
support and local activism left a lasting mark in a raised consciousness and new 
militancy among the local people. As the AVs characterized it, before the start of 
their effort “the primary words used to describe the isolated Appalachian Moun-
taineer were apathetic, unmotivated, uninspiring, culturally deprived … At the 
present time we are hearing him described as activist, trouble-maker, organized, 
impatient, frustrated, and in some cases angry (168).”  After the disbanding of 
their own organization many of the AVs returned to work with the CSM, bringing 
their radical perspectives and goals with them.
Hasan Kwame Jeffries’s Bloody Lowndes: Civil Rights and Black Power 
in Alabama’s Black Belt provides a nuanced portrait of the marriage between 
federal policy initiatives and local activism in the battle to dismantle Jim Crow, 
focusing on the months from March 1965 through November 1966 when SNCC 
workers, led by Stokely Carmichael, were active in Lowndes County, Alabama. 
The challenge to white supremacy in Lowndes—long quiescent under the op-
pressive violence that had earned it its menacing moniker—came in March 1965, 
a few days before the confrontation on the Edmund Pettus Bridge, when a group 
of black citizens presented themselves at the county courthouse to register to 
vote. Denied, they formed the Lowndes County Christian Movement for Hu-
man Rights (LCCMHR). Simultaneous with this indigenous development, the 
county attracted the attention of SNCC activists looking for a new project after 
their displacement from Selma by SCLC. SNCC activists were in Lowndes by 
the end of the month, partnering with LCCMHR to register voters. The joint ef-
fort showed quick success. Attendance at mass meetings “skyrocketed,” from a 
hundred participants at a late March meeting to nearly a thousand at gatherings 
two weeks later (69). 
Still smarting from the Democratic National Convention’s August 1964 re-
jection of the MFDP, SNCC activists promoted the idea of forming a third party 
to the LCCMHR. The proposal meshed well with residents’ growing sense (the 
fruit of their months of organizing experience) that protests alone would not be 
enough to make change in the county and that political power was necessary. 
Lowndes activists formed what became the Lowndes County Freedom Party 
(LCFP) in April 1966. The party held its first nominating convention that May 
and fielded a ticket of candidates in the November county elections. 
Jeffries is enamored of the LCFP, describing the party in terms of what it 
aspired to be but only briefly was: a party of working-class and poor people that 
engaged in collective decision making, chose its candidates for office from among 
the county’s working class rather than its elites, and pursued a broad agenda 
including both civil and human rights. Although LCFP was not able to elect its 
candidates in November 1966, it captured 80 percent of the black vote and 42 
percent of the total county vote, enough to require Alabama to recognize it as 
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an official party. In 1970 the party—now merged with a statewide, interracial, 
independent party—elected a black man, leading local activist John Hulett, as 
Lowndes County sheriff. By 1980, African-American officials were in control 
of the Lowndes county commission.
But bright prospects quickly dimmed. The LCFP had few allies and class 
antagonisms loomed large. As Hulett saw it, the LCFP’s “biggest fight … is 
among our own people, like the . . . school teachers and preachers who don’t want 
any part in it because once the common Negro moves up he will become equal 
with him” (176–77). The political establishment was equally opposed. SCLC 
activists wanted black voters to stay inside the Democratic Party and help elect 
moderate whites, believing this was the “way . . . to realize the full potential of 
re-enfranchisement” (167). Lowndes politics quickly reverted to business-as-
usual. Once in office Hulett used his evident political skills to establish himself 
as county boss. By the early 1990s, most of Lowndes’s black citizens no longer 
bothered to vote. 
Jeffries’s telling makes clear that federal officials played an important, even 
preponderant, role in forcing the Lowndes county reforms of 1965–66. Signifi-
cant advances were made only with the federal thumb on the African-American 
community’s side of the scale, as is illustrated by the Lowndes voter registration 
drive. That effort stalled over the summer of 1965 in the face of county officials’ 
intransigence but was revived spectacularly after August 14 when federal regis-
trars arrived, less than a week after VRA passage.
Although local activists did make savvy use of federal resources, Jeffries’s 
suggestion that locals controlled federal interventions in Lowndes—that local 
action “compelled” (78) federal responses or that it was local action that “drew 
Washington into the struggle” (118)—is not supported by evidence provided 
here. The Johnson administration strategy for national implementation of Great 
Society legislation likely determined federal moves. 
But if local action did not directly shape federal policy or its implementa-
tion it was nonetheless essential for the achievement of national policy goals. 
Jeffries’s metric for evaluating the events of 1965–66 in Lowndes is calibrated 
on changes in process rather than the achievement of discrete program outcomes. 
Activism in Lowndes transformed local politics, creating the African-American 
demand for civic inclusion to which federal efforts responded. The presence of 
federal registrars made possible the certification of hundreds of new voters, but it 
was LCCMHR and SNCC activism that ensured that the lines at the courthouse 
door would be long. For Jeffries, then, the impact of federal involvement “cannot 
be measured solely by the success rate of lawsuits or grant applications” (118). 
Rather, its value lay in the “grassroots organizing that federal involvement gener-
ated,” producing “a wealth of experiential knowledge . . . [that] helped transform 
black politics” (119) through “the slow and hard work of organizing” (141). 
Each of these five works shows the Great Society years as a time when 
American policy aspirations, and hubris, confronted American political and 
administrative ability to deliver. Their findings suggest that there is plenty more 
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information about what drove Great Society policymaking to be wrung out of 
the experience of the Johnson years. 
The causes and consequences of policy initiatives and social movements are 
diffuse. Patterson and Zelizer assert the importance of specific developments—
civil rights activism, the 1964 landslide, Vietnam escalation —in explaining the 
period and its legislative legacy, but this narrow-gauge view is unsatisfying. 
These searches for discrete causal factors do not adequately credit or explore the 
larger currents in the liberal moment that shaped Great Society undertakings and 
their outcomes. Zelizer’s close look at legislative dynamics should be matched 
by additional explorations of the politics of administering and implementing 
Great Society programs. There is, predictably, more work to be done in setting 
the Great Society in its mid-century context. 
On the other hand, case studies by May, Kiffmeyer, and Jeffries point to 
interconnections between policy in Washington and activism in local communi-
ties but do not diagram the mechanisms by which these connections may have 
operated to change policy outcomes. These works point as well to the difficulty 
of achieving the Great Society goals, given the lack of political will to address 
structural causes of inequality. Clearer understanding of these processes may 
better illuminate the Great Society effort. 
Perhaps most significant is the evidence of the diffuse nature of policy 
impacts that the Kiffmeyer and Jeffries studies provide. Experiences in both Ap-
palachia and Alabama suggest that an essential measure of Johnson administration 
policies is that of their impact, for better or for worse, on the political education 
of citizens and the reshaping of civic expectations. The measure of Great Society 
success may be less a matter of the achievement of discrete program goals than of 
the extent to which the strength of communities—their civic competence—was 
enhanced in working toward them.
